2 The underlying interest springs from the fact that the discourse of aesthetics played a central role in the constitution of modern German identity. Aesthetics inform the emergence, trajectory, and legitimation of Germany's state institutions as well as its system of education and culture. The original formulation of aesthetics in Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schiller, G. W. F. Hegel, and others had been idealist. The rise of a unified German state under Bismarck required that key concepts in what Marx would have been pleased to call "the German ideology" should be examined and justified objectively. If possible, this was to be done by experimentation, but failing that by rigorous, methodical introspection. (German empirical psychologists were as divided on this methodological question as their American heirs remain.) At this time, German aesthetics took an empirical, even materialist turn. Empirical examination of the psychology of aesthetic response was widely cultivated, and it conferred great professional ethos on those psychologists who were taken to treat the subject insightfully.
3 Eventually the concept of empathy became residual in aesthetics. The waning of empathy as an aesthetic concept is what left this notion available for other uses, such as those related to psychotherapy and ethics. If we ask why aesthetics turned away from empathy, it is tempting to see this as due, among other things, to the modern ist artistic movements that prized as artistic effects alienation and defamiliarization rather than identification. It is also relevant that the Nazi state gave aesthetics as a whole, but especially on the moral and political side, a black eye. A suspicion of aesthetics lurks, for example, in the writings of Jürgen Habermas. He particularly doubts a key theorem of German aesthetics that goes back to Schiller: namely the notion that cultivating judgments of the beautiful and the sublime leads to moral sensitivity and political reform. 2 Many take the Holocaust to have discredited that idea more or less completely, and with it any strong link between aesthetics and empathy. Empathy, yes, we might say; aesthetics, no. 9 As tie to aesthetics weakened, the notion that empathy can be objectified into or projected onto every sort of object -whether inanimate, animate, or personal -we experience aesthetically (the joyous chirping of birds, the sadness of the willow tree, the sublimity of the stars) also began to dissipate. By our own time, empathy comes to be restricted to what we "feel into" other people and maybe a few animals. But here the theory of Einfühlung virtually turns itself on its head. Originally the paradigmatic cases of empathy were inanimate objects, including "expressive" works of art. Once psychotherapy and ethics captured the term, however, persons became paradigmatic. With the exception of a few higher animals, mostly pets, persons seem now the exclusive objects of empathy. With this change, comes another. In the original theory, empathy acknowledges that the feelings we feel about others are actually our own; in the new meaning, empathy refers to our ability to identify with others by getting in contact with feelings that they have (although the ability to empathize in this sense might be stimulated by analogous experiences we have had).
10 To reflect on this reversal of meaning, we should recall that Lipps' aesthetic Einfühlung, empatheia, or empathy was integral to "the expressivist turn" in aesthetics. The vocabulary of expression and expressionism has been deposited into the common sense of modern languages by a sequence of more or less successful artistic movements. It has become so pervasive and seemingly transparent that we fail to see that it was put in place not so long ago. We fail to note that it helped self-consciously realistic, objectivistic psychologists like Lipps deny that our finer feelings intimate or refer tacitly to a universal "feeling together" (sympathy) among all things. Lipps and company did not trace our creativity and aesthetic receptivity to such sympathy, nor did they explain artists as better attuned to it than the rest of us.
11 The "sympathetic" view explains aesthetic experience through recourse to philosophical idealism. It holds that consciousness itself constitutes, in varying degrees, the very nature of whatever exists. The sympathetic idealist argues that all nature affords appropriate, veridical objects of our feeling states -exactly to the extent that everything is, to one degree or another, alive and that every living thing shows at least faint traces of mind. By contrast, the philosophy of expression -the German word is Ausdruckasserts different ways of accounting for aesthetic creativity and receptivity. Expressive accounts do not presuppose, as did the hitherto dominant aesthetics of romanticism, that "nature may be really penetrable through and through by thought . . . that the stubborn opposition of subject and object which appears to vanish in the deepest sympathy may really be an illusion, and that in reality all people and things are one." 10 To connect empathy to the expressivist turn is thus to deny the reality of sympathy in the strong sense suggested the quoted formulation. It is also to repudiate the radical, revolutionary politics of the romantic movement: the politics of Schiller and Beethoven, who proclaimed that " alle Menschen wërden Brüder."
12 Romanticism taught that my aesthetic feeling not only is objective but is referentially the same feeling that exists in the object. The feeling is literally shared. In the eighteenth century, even before the romantics radicalized the term, one sympathized with someone or something. One did not have sympathy for them.
13 At the outset of the twentieth century, though, a new generation of idealist philosophers came belatedly to the defense of this romantic theory and with it the orientation of aesthetics toward the ultimate truth. These later idealists coöpted expression from its psychologistic opponents. I have in mind such thinkers as Benedetto Croce and Josiah Royce. Both thought that rejecting the objective reference of aesthetic intuitions spelled something little short of nihilism. They took seriously the claim that experiences of beauty and sublimity are propaideutic to morality. So they tried to re-secure the objectivity of aesthetics by propounding, implausibly enough, a metaphysical idealism more radical than Hegel's. They asserted not a universal sympathy but a universal "expressiveness."
14 The change in terminology was not without influence. Even today so fine an interpreter of Hegel as Charles Taylor can propose to locate his late-eighteenth-and early-nineteenth-century subject in an "expressivist culture." Thus he uses a term that, in its anachronism, brings much unwanted baggage with it. 11 Having been displaced expression, sympathy began the long decline into its current, sentimental sense associated with Hallmark cards. The older meaning of sympathy had been articulated by a succession of thinkers, ranging from Shaftsbury to Hegel, who were far more insightful and politically radical than idealist epigones in the late nineteenth century.
15 What remains most fundamentally true, if overlooked, is that empathy was coined to replace or redefine sympathy. The theory of art as expression (rather than intimation) was the vehicle for this deflation of sympathy into empathy. We may see this process at work in Lipps, though he is far from alone among thinkers of his generation. In summarizing the main points of his aesthetic theory at the outset of the second volume of his Die Aesthetische Beitrachtung und die Bildende Kunst, Lipps claims that the connection between Einfühlung and Ausdruck is definitional. If there is to be a gap between an aesthetic object and its psychological ground, the aesthetic object must be an expression of the psychological ground.
16 The aesthetic object then amounts to an ex-pression, an outpressing, a squeezing out, as of grapes to make wine. On this account, we press out our feelings onto external objects. "In aesthetic experience," Lipps wrote, "a sensuous object distinct from me 'expresses' [ ausdruckt] something interior or soullike." 12 Thus we experience willows as sad, weeping. But we must not mistake this for willows pressing their feelings into us. From our perspective, that would be an im-pression: an in-pressing like the type face printing onto a page or John Locke's stylus of experience pressing into the blank slates of our minds. In aesthetic experience, however, according to Lipps and company, we project our feelings onto willows. Presumably we do this on the basis of schematic similarities -the drooping leaves, for examplethat make willows "expressive" of our feelings. For Lipps, aesthetic experience is a placing of our feelings into willows. It does not refer, however obscurely, to any fact about the experiences of willow trees. A fortiori it does not mean that we share the same feelings as the occasioning objects. We, not the willows, feel sad.
17 Aside from idealists like Croce, virtually all of twentieth-century aesthetics taught that each human, whether as creator or perceiver, brings his or her own feelings to the expressive object. The art object is merely a stimulus. 20 Curiously enough, them, empathy's current work closely resembles the work that sympathy was supposed to do in the heyday of romantic idealism, but no longer does. Empathy is to bind us together -alle Menschen werden Brüder (und Schwestern) -in ways that Einfühlung originally was intended to dowse in a little cold water. In its current meaning, empathy is a repair concept. We use it to restore the sympathy that buoyed modernity in its salad days. Conventionally we restrict this new empathy to the shared or mutually projected feelings of human beings, or those animals where we experience some resonance of human psychology. Thus we free our sense of empathy from the metaphysical burdens that the earlier notion of sympathy seemed unable to bear. Nevertheless questions about any grounding of empathy in the reality of an intersubjective relationship, potential or actual, remain to be clarified.
From the start, Lipps himself had distinguished between Einfühlung and specifically aesthetic Einfühlung. The influence of Lipps' own work, however, produced a narrowing of the term's actual use to aesthetics. I imagine that Freud moved in the opposite direction: from the objectifying or projective aspect of aesthetic Einfühlung to psychological projection generally.
